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It’s The Minimum

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If you didn't have standards, this might be your first out engine. Swan River, Queensland, Australia 2002

If you didn't have standards, this might be your first out engine. Swan Creek/Emu Creek Bushfire Brigade, Queensland, Australia 2002

Authentic Neapolitan pizzas are typically made with tomatoes and Mozzarella cheese.  Genuine Neapolitan pizza dough consists of high-protein wheat flour (type 0 or 00, or a mixture of both), natural Neapolitan yeast or brewer’s yeast, salt and water. The dough must be kneaded by hand or with a low-speed mixer. After the rising process, the dough must be formed by hand without the help of a rolling pin or other machine, and may be no more than 3 mm (⅛ in) thick. The pizza must be baked for 60–90 seconds in a 485 °C (905 °F) stone oven with an oak-wood fire.[4] When cooked, it should be crispy, tender and fragrant.

Those were just a few of the standards for an authentic Neapolitan pizza (published on Wikipedia), as recognized and protected by the Associazione Vera Pizza Napoletana.  Likewise, most of the things you take for granted in the world, with the exception of things like knock-off Rolexes, are constructed from materials meeting standards, are built to certain standards, and if they carry any kind of guarantee of quality or workmanship, must meet performance standards.

Unless your organization is living in a 1950’s time warp, the people in your community, when they call the fire department for help, expect help for many things that exceed the scope of “firefighting”.  Regardless of whether your community is staffed with a career or a volunteer department, there are increased expectations on the level of service being provided.  I can rationally argue the need for standards on a number of different levels.  I will, however, only provide you with this one today; it’s the minimum.

If you want to call yourself a firefighter, there are certain things you should be able to do.  If you cannot do these things, you run the risk of hurting yourself, not to mention others.  You also run the risk of making an emergency greater than it was when you arrived.  As a reasonable and prudent individual with a duty to act, you agree that your “job” (as a firefighter) entails certain knowledge, skills, and abilities to allow your organization the ability to advertise a product. What that product is in your jurisdiction could be limited to fighting fire or could be all-hazards, or anywhere in between.

Your community, in supporting the “fire department”, does so with the understanding that you are what you say you are.  The community defines that expectation; if their only expectation is that a group of bubbas show up to put out a fire when it occurs, then maybe you don’t need to meet a standard.  If that’s the case though, when insurance companies decide the risk is too great in your community, don’t be surprised when the citizenry can’t get coverage and they hang you (or your chief) in effigy at the town square.  And that may be getting off light.

Minimum standards, among other things, define.  Since a group of individuals representing different aspects of the world affected by a certain thing decided and agreed on a definition, and that group is recognized by the others affected by that thing, the definition becomes a standard.  I could write a standard on constructing nuclear plants and declare it the minimum standard, but since I have no authority or expertise in doing so, my standard would likely be considered meaningless and useless.

For those who aren’t in favor of standards, I’d suggest that it’s not that you aren’t in favor of standards, but what is in those standards and how they came to be.  If that’s the case, I’d say that before you make any proclamations on a standard being a “bad” standard, you seek to understand how that definition came to be and how it happens to be the minimum.  In many cases, I’d bet that you’d find that others wanted a much stricter or more restricting definition and the end result was what everyone on that committee agreed was acceptable for use or was prudent.

Like I tell the people who work with me, don’t complain about anything unless you tried to do something about it.  If you don’t like a standard, feel free to get involved.  But the long and short of it is this: standards exist for at least one primary reason, and that reason is to define what something is.  In the absence of any other meaningful definition, if something close fills that void, that standard will be the one that defines the subject matter.  You can be angry about it if you like, but if you don’t like it, change it.

In the meanwhile, if it’s an accepted standard, you can assume you’ll have to meet it.  You can say all day that you choose not to meet certain standards, but if you are like me, you will understand that to not do so will leave you open to a number of things, including liability.  The only way to escape it is to lay that decision on the people who are at that payscale: the politicians. But that’s a blog post for another day.

Stay safe and do the best you can with what you have.  But remember, the standard is what defines you.  If you have no standard, you have no definition, and in that case, a monkey can do your job.  Even pizzas are made to standards.  If having no standard is what your community believes to be okay, then know that you ultimately get what you pay for, and if your community doesn’t support a department with minimum expectations of members, they shouldn’t be surprised when everything within the city limits are a smoking ruin some weekend.

Posted by truck6alpha on July 28, 2010 • Filed under: Command & Leadership, Fire Rescue Topics, Firefighter Nation, Firefighter Safety & Health, Firefighting Operations, Funding & Staffing, NIMS, Training & Development, US&R, change, credentialing, education, government, leadership, motivation, officership, planning, politics, professionalism, safety • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Where Were You That Night?

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I probably can’t tell you anything about the Charleston incident that you don’t already know, except the incident from my personal perspective, and I have never shared that with anyone except my family and some close friends until today.  And despite the statements bashed around in the days afterward about why things were the way they were prior to that night, there’s no amount of warning, yelling, or cajoling that could have happened before that day or after that day to really change things, because honestly, you can’t change someone who won’t listen.

As was quoted by at least one of my friends from the CFD prior to that night: “We’re the FDNY of the South.”  When your fire department has a Class 1 ISO rating and homes aren’t burning into the dirt on a daily basis, the public is just fine with whatever it is you are doing.  Whether your organization is using the most modern equipment and techniques, or whether they are utilizing tactics thrown away in the 70′s, there are much more important things on the public radar.  Things like whether or not the garbage will get picked up, or who the next contestant is on The Bachelor, or which rehab facility Lindsay Lohan is skipping out of.  The entire community of Charleston and the fire department itself, prior to that day, was fine and happy with the status quo.  Just like any disaster, it isn’t until people die that questions begin to be asked.

This isn’t an indictment of the department, its culture, or anyone in particular.  All I know is what I know and the things that were said before, on and after that night.  A big reason why I have never said anything really about it until now is that I wasn’t asked (I was this time).  But nothing I care to say would be intended to disparage the reputations or the character of the brave members of the CFD.  I simply believe that the charismatic style of their leader at the time led them down a primrose path.  He thought he was doing the right thing, everyone else there thought he was doing the right thing, and nothing seemed like it could go wrong, until it did.  Catastrophically.

I wasn’t at the incident in the beginning and frankly, in retrospect, there were many disasters converging at that exact location that evening.  It was inevitable that something bad would happen, given some of what we knew before, and of course, given what we know now.  I had to shake my head in wonder when I saw that one poster on a blog page wanted to know, “Where are all the chiefs in SC?” on the issue.  ”Why wouldn’t they do something before this disaster?”  Well, let me tell you a little bit about fire departments in the United States: Unless the public or their elected officials detect a problem, there is never going to be any change, no matter WHAT the chiefs in the neighboring communities or the state have to say about it. After the disaster, it is true, the collective anger and frustration not only from within, but from the overall fire service community was instrumental in causing a change, but really, it took the deaths of nine brave souls to make that change manifest.

All we can do now is honor the lives of those who go before us, pray for the families and help them deal with this tragedy, and hope we all learn from the events that evening.  Senseless doesn’t begin to describe the loss suffered by the principals of this story, and although I chalk up a great deal of what happened to hubris and over-confidence by the Fire Chief, and by default, the organizational culture, I don’t take anything away from the extremely fine and dedicated brothers who serve the community of Charleston, SC.  I can only pray that we don’t experience something like this again anywhere else on the globe.  In my heart, however, I know there are departments out there who learned nothing from this, therefore, we are only a heartbeat away from repeating these mistakes again.

I was lying on the couch in my living room when I got the first call.  The power was out at our house, so I was just working on my laptop, having just put the children to bed.  At the time, I was the Acting Director of the South Carolina US&R Task Force and awaiting our hiring a full-time Director to take my place in Columbia.  One of my Task Force Leaders rang my cell phone and asked if I had been briefed on what was going on in Charleston.  He said that there were several firefighters unaccounted for in a fire at the Sofa Superstore.

I am intimately familiar with Charleston.  I did the majority of my paramedic clinical time there in the 80′s and fell in love with the place.  My mother-in-law grew up in Charleston and we would go up there to visit her family, especially her well-connected sister and brother-in-law, often.   And when our second daughter, Caroline, was born, she developed complications resulting in a helo ride to the Medical University and a subsequent six-week stay in the neonatal ICU.  In response, my wife and I literally moved to Charleston and lived at a friend’s second home at King and Broad for the entire time.  We go back often and have developed many close friendships there.

I am also friends with a number of Charleston’s firefighters, although I never had the honor of meeting any of our brothers who passed that evening.  But at the time, no one really seemed to know who was involved, much less who was missing, so for all I knew, it could have been any one of the people I had grown to know over the years of interacting with the department.  And yes, I knew Rusty and many of the command staff who were there that evening, much as a result of my capacity with the Task Force and the ultimate oversight of their regional response team’s interaction with the State US&R Plan.

There’s really not much you can say when you get one of those calls.  I’ve been called for others like it before and several hours later find that the news was completely distorted from the original message.  You know, everyone ends up accounted for, or there was a mistake in transmission, or something like that.  And although I had every reason to believe what I was being told was true (this TFL has always been a good friend and dependable officer), I have to admit I was a little skeptical.  I told him to call me if he had any other information, and I’d call the State Fire Marshal, John Reich, who as the ESF-9 coordinator for the state, I technically reported to, and give him a heads-up.

When the power came back on a little while later, I clicked over to the Charleston news station and saw the coverage, and was immediately swayed by what was going on: an active search and rescue incident looking for multiple companies of missing firefighters.  Needless to say, things began to move pretty quickly, and it was really pretty much a blur after that.  Multiple phone calls between multiple state officers and the next thing was, the State Fire Marshal was asking us to represent the state at the incident and to offer whatever assistance was needed.

I can tell you this, given any State agency’s relationship with local entities, we were instantly cognizant that what we DIDN’T want was one of our incident support teams (IST) rolling in there and announcing we were there to take over, because we weren’t.  Not only would that be extremely callous and insensitive to the situation, we have no statutory authority to do so, short of a gubanatorial declaration of disaster (and that wasn’t coming).  So this was going to be a mission of extreme delicacy and an offer of assistance from the State Fire Marshal’s Office, and as such, I felt like it would be best if I went personally, even though we had an IST sitting across the river in Mt. Pleasant.

I called up Ed Boring and Jason Walters, who at the time were both Task Force command officers and work with me at Hilton Head Island, and told them I was heading up to Charleston on direction from John Reich.  Ed and Jason continue to work with me and over the years have become two of my closest friends not just because of our shared interests, but also because we served together at Katrina.  Nothing like a disaster and riding around in a dark-colored Suburban to create a bonding experience.

On our arrival, we were each stupified by the absolute desolation on the scene.  We got there before midnight, and at that point it was still not clear how many souls had been lost.  Everyone was in shock, or so it seemed.  The fire was still burning in places, but everyone seemed to be moving like their feet were in concrete.  Not in a slow, poorly organized way, but in a stunned, defeated, bewildered way.  It was definitely the scene of an enormous and horrendous event.

We delicately announced our need to report to the command post so we could speak to the incident commander, and kept getting pointed in a direction until we were finally pointed toward an empty pop-up tent with a single fold-up chair in the middle of the parking lot.  No one was there.  So we began to again poke around a little bit more, until we found Battalion Chief Robbie O’Donald, over by the ladder truck, which was still in the air.  Robbie, who was a member of SC-TF1 and also a member of the Charleston command staff, had very obvious burns across his hands and arms, but was standing at the front of the building with a portable radio.  I remember very softly calling to Chief O’Donald, because I honestly believed he was in total shock.  The burns on both of his arms were pretty graphic, with skin literally falling off of his arms, but here he was, still at his post.

After a brief discussion about who was in charge and where he was at, I asked Robbie if he realized his arms were burned.  He just kind of nodded and made a quiet, brief comment about trying to get someone out.  I asked him if he wanted to get his burns checked out, he just said he’d be okay.  Ignoring my suggestion, he led us over to a nearby gas station where the police had set up a command post of sorts, but no one was there either, so we went back over to the front of the store and stood around for a little.  Finally, I said to Robbie, “Hey, John Reich sent us up here to see if there’s anything we can do for you.”  Without answering me, he began to detail out for us where all the firefighters were lost at, including two on the other side of the wall from where we were standing.

I remember there was a back hoe sitting in front of the store.  ”You aren’t going to dig them out with that, are you?” I asked.  Given the state everyone was in, I didn’t quite know what to take for granted.  ”Man, I can bring you the entire task force down here, or just trucks and equipment if you guys want to do this yourselves, but you tell us what YOU want, we’ll do whatever it is YOU want.”  Trying to push him a little, I gave him my official business card, to indicate the official nature of my being there, and told him to take it to Rusty, and to let him know that whatever he needed, we’d get it there, just name it.  So Robbie took the card and went into the building and out of our sight, which was where Chief Thomas was.

After a while, Chief O’Donald came back out and told me, “Chief Rusty says we’re fine.”  Something in his face told me differently, and I’ve had enough experience to also know that things weren’t fine.  But I wasn’t going to argue.

“Robbie, we’ll be right over there,” I pointed to the street, “if you guys change your mind.”  He was staring back into the building again and I put my hand on his arm to let him know we were serious.  ”I don’t have the authorization to make a decision for Hilton Head, but given what’s going on here, if you need people up here to cover you guys, I know we can get a bunch of guys up here to cover you at least on a volunteer basis.”  He shook his head again and said, “Chief Rusty said we’ve got it.”

So we just wandered back to the road and got out of the way.  I called John Reich and gave him my report and said that we needed to send another representative later on when some of the shock wore off.  Then Ed and Jason and I stood by the road and watched as they carried the first five or six out, I don’t even really remember because at that point, I felt like this was something they needed to do themselves, and I wasn’t going to push the matter.  If they were my people, I’d want to be the one who carried them out, so I understood.  I also felt like our presence there, at that point, was more of a bystander than being of assistance, so we made our offers again, and with them saying once again they had everything under control, we left.  The ride home was pretty quiet.

I look back on that night with a certain amount of disbelief.  Did a department who fought as many fires as Charleston did really think they were going to make a knock on a commercial building fire with a single 2 1/2 inch supply line from a distant hydrant?  Did they really think an attack on a heavily-loaded big box with booster lines was a sufficient attack strategy?  Did they completely forget about the thermal imager sitting on their apparatus?  Did their hubris really lead them to reject the notion of calling for outside resources early into the incident?  Did the idea that “we fight these fires every day” with no semblance of modern command and control overwhelm the logical need for a coordinated rescue supported by protective lines?  Rather than trying to attack a fast-mover without opening up the overheads, might we have not approached this with a more defensive attack once it was realized that a victim was trapped in the rear of the building?

We can “what if” this incident to death, but it doesn’t reverse the past.  I personally know many of the key players in this saga and I can reassure you, none of them went to work that morning thinking, “Hey, I think I’ll kill off a few firefighters today”.  But that’s what happened and no matter how sure you are of yourself, when you lose nine firefighters and someone asks you, “Given what you know now, would you fight this fire differently?” and you say, “No”, you have got a serious problem.

Resources will always be a problem in the fire service.  We never have what we really need to do our jobs and we are always going to be understaffed.  We will always be questioned by the public as to why it takes so many of us to fight a fire and why does it all cost so damn much.  Then when all hell breaks loose, if we don’t make things happen, the public will scream that we didn’t do our job.  It’s the never-ending dichotomy of public service.  But to look at the lessons learned that evening and ignore them, well, it’s tantamount to killing your people.

It’s this simple: if you can’t fight the fire without killing your people, then why bother?  If a rescue were being made, it’s one thing, but the men who lost their lives weren’t in any position to mount a defense for the rescue teams; they were in attack positions and eventually retreat positions with nowhere to go.  They were actively trying to seek out a hidden fire while the whole time they were playing a game stacked against them.  There WAS no “Plan B”.  I’m not sure there was a “Plan A”.  If you drive by there today, it’s a big vacant lot.  These guys gave up their lives for their community, they gave what is identified in the Bible as being the greatest gift one can give to their fellow man: their lives.  But just like the 343 men who died in the World Trade Center, the public has a short memory of these people and their mission.  And when we ask for more funds, more manpower, or more equipment, more training, more support, or more apparatus, unless the stain of blood is still on the hands of the civilians from the latest disaster du jour, they have moved on to the next media extravaganza of the week.

Me, I have an obligation to my family to come home in the morning.  I have an obligation to the families of my personnel to make sure they leave in the morning as well. If I don’t keep sharp, if I don’t fully comprehend the situation I am sending companies in to engage, and if I don’t have the means to put the tools in their hands they need, then I am failing them.  No amount of pride, a patch, a label, or honors will do you any good when you are carrying out your dead and for what?  If we can’t be there for each other, what have we really got?

Where were you that night?  You may not have been there, but the lessons are all available for us to read and to learn from.  If we fail to address the deficiencies, or short of that, at least identify methods of modifying our approach, or even less, realizing we simply don’t have the appropriate resources and stating: “we’re going to let it burn”, then we are ignoring the legacy of these fine men, these Charleston Nine, who have gone on before us.  As leaders, we have a responsibility to learn and not make the same mistakes again.  Honor these men by perfecting our craft and striving for positive change in the fire service.  I never knew them, but I’ll bet that’s what they’d have wanted.  Let’s keep them forever in our memory and insure they are never forgotten.

Posted by truck6alpha on June 16, 2010 • Filed under: Administration & Leadership, Command & Leadership, Fire Rescue Topics, Firefighter Nation, Funding & Staffing, In the Line of Duty, LODD, Line of Duty, Major Incidents, NIMS, Training & Development, US&R, command, leadership, motivation, officership, professionalism • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

US&R in Haiti: Wishing vs. Planning

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SC-TF1 US&R working in St. Tammany Parish, LA after Katrina.

SC-TF1 US&R working in St. Tammany Parish, LA after Katrina.

I’m sure everyone out there continues to keep an eye on Haiti.  I’m not easily shocked, yet even I have been amazed at some of the scenes from down there.  Every time I see another bit of news, I want to go hug my children and remind myself how fortunate we are.

When friends and family see the situation there, not knowing how US&R deployments really work, I get asked if SC-TF1 is going.  Each time, I have taken that opportunity to explain the workings (and separation) between the USAID/DART assets and domestic response (FEMA US&R and State US&R assets) and how “task forces just aren’t sent to international disasters through FEMA”.  Of course, by saying “never”, something I NEVER thought I’d see in all of my years working in this business is occurring: the cooperation and coordination of FEMA with EMAC for the possibility (note I said, “possibility”, not “probability”) of State US&R Task Forces being deployed along with FEMA-sanctioned assets to an international disaster.

But all that being said, in watching the events unfolding, I continue to try to get my head around the response and it frankly has been a challenge.  With any disaster, there needs to be an attack plan, but in most cases, these plans hinge on some basic tenets of organization, none of these which seem to apply in Haiti.  Having been hit by several prior disasters recently, the country was already in extremis and the current situation obviously doesn’t improve things.

I have already heard from my sources that the teams that are there are working under heavy force protection.  Any of us that thought operating in New Orleans post-Katrina was sketchy, one look at the situation in Haiti makes us understand that at least we had the force of law SOMEWHERE on our side.  Reports have indicated that aside from the overwhelming number of missions and dangerous conditions, another part of the reason that engaging missions is problematic is because there simply isn’t any way to get the equipment from the airport to the disaster: roads were bad to begin with, there’s only one active runway at the airport, and there’s no machinery to off-load equipment and supplies.  Once the materials do happen to get onto the ground, no matter what conventions you try to apply for allocating the resources, there isn’t any guarantee the locals will comply with it anyway.

So for this disaster, there are other “sub-disasters” that make it much more dire, and even the media isn’t astute enough to understand it.  This situation is going to get MUCH worse before it gets better, because there’s no way to effectively get the help to where it needs to go, and if it did get there, there’s no guarantee that it will be applied to the right area anyway (unless you count “at gunpoint” as an effective means of allocating resources).

While equipment and supplies are arriving, we could just send everything we have to the area, but without the people who know how to work it, the equipment is useless.  While one friend of mine said to this, “If you gave me a concrete cutting saw, I could probably figure it out”; I mentioned to him that if you didn’t know water was an important part in making the saw blade cut more effectively, failing to do something as simple as that might mean the difference between extricating someone with one blade or a half-dozen blades.  It occurs to me that there are nuances of working with our US&R tools that are completely lost on the uninitiated.  I said this the other day: “It’s the definition between an organized US&R resource and ‘mobs with shovels’”.

My point is, after all this rambling, is that this is very much a teachable moment for everyone, just as I hoped Katrina and other disaster have been.  Even for some of my non-emergency service readers out there, there is an extremely important lesson to be learned: Every community must understand its vulnerabilities and the potential for disaster, and plan accordingly.

The caveat to this is, that despite the presence of a written plan, you can have every contingency covered and discussed, if you don’t understand and practice the plan, it isn’t worth the paper it is written on (Anybody remember Katrina?).

It is imperative that elected officials along with those of us who serve the public safety sector of our respective communities (AND the citizens living in those communities) understand what likely scenarios can occur, know where the vulnerable populations exist, and understand what resources are needed.

For responders: If those resources aren’t readily available, it is then incumbent upon us all to know where to get those resources, how to legally obtain and use them, and even more important, when and how to call them.

For the elected officials: It requires insistence on development of these plans as well as FUNDING to support the plans.

For non-responder citizens: Maybe you should understand that you have a part in this as well, to insure you are prepared to go it alone for at least 72 hours and maybe have some ability to rely on your own preparedness and not look to government for the total solution.  Try checking out the recommendations here at the FEMA website.

So without too much further delay, maybe this is a moment for all of you (elected officials, responders, and citizens) to dig out your volumes of plans and look through them and begin to understand not only what is in them, but at least what your part in that plan will be if, God forbid, you have to utilize them.   While we here in the United States are subject to the same disasters as other nations, at least here, there is the force of law to keep this type of situation from getting out of hand (note the sarcasm).  My suggestion: have a plan, support it, practice it, and if things go badly, USE IT.

Stay safe and let’s keep the responders as well as the citizens of Haiti in our prayers.

Posted by truck6alpha on January 16, 2010 • Filed under: DHS, FEMA, Fire Rescue Topics, Firefighter Nation, Funding & Staffing, Major Incidents, NIMS, News, Rescues, SAR, Special Operations, US&R, USAR, government, politics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Urban Search and Rescue – Rockbreaking 101

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SC-TF1, GA, and MD-TF2 working with St. Bernard, LA at Katrina

SC-TF1, GA, and MD-TF2 working with St. Bernard, LA at Katrina

Since there seems to be a huge lean forward from people who want to know more about US&R, and since US&R is (and has been) one of my main projects for over twenty years, I figure I’ll take the opportunity to point you all in some directions for information, as well as provide some useful links other than the standard FEMA sites.  I’ll start off with one or two and add some more as time permits.

Also, if I have missed a good link (or source), please add it, because any errors or omissions are likely just my failure to remember someone while sitting here for a moment, rather than deliberate exclusion.

I’ll start of course with my baby: the South Carolina US&R Task Force, which is a state-sponsored NIMS Type 1 equivalent US&R Task Force.  Our deployment to St. Tammany and St. Bernard Parishes during Hurricane Katrina established us on the map as a viable response asset.  While I am no longer the Director of this organization but serve as Deputy Director in an advisory role, it is still my pride and joy.

There is another US&R project of which I am very fond: the State Urban Search and Rescue Alliance, better known by its acronym, “SUSAR”.  This began as a consortium of 19 states, including Puerto Rico, meeting for the first time in July 2005 at the South Carolina Fire Academy in Columbia, SC.  Now it has representatives from over 41 states and we have earned the consideration by many other affiliated organizations as we help to advocate for these state teams which previously had no voice.

One Firefighter Nation there are several US&R “social” groups: Urban Search and Rescue, of course; USAR/FEMA; and USAR.  You can join into the discussions there and say your piece, or at least get to meet other like-minded individuals.  There is also the Cancel The Engine site on there, which has a lot of rockbreakers hanging out looking for something to tear up.

I’ll take the time to add some more later, but if you have a link near and dear to you, feel free to add it on a comment, and if it is appropriate, I’ll add it in.

Posted by truck6alpha on January 15, 2010 • Filed under: DHS, FEMA, Fire Rescue Topics, Firefighter Nation, NIMS, News, Rescues, SAR, Special Operations, US&R, USAR, government, leadership, politics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Use of Faith-Based NGOs As Disaster Response Partners

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tfcc_pano1For some of the new readers here, not only is Firehouse Zen about enlightened leadership, it is about management issues and creative solutions to ongoing problems in the emergency service industry.  If you are a long-time reader, you may recall our discussions in the past regarding disaster response and credentialing, and in an effort to dip back into some of the issues of disaster management, I’d like to point you all toward the excellent website of the Natural Hazards Research Center at the University of Colorado – Boulder.

In their latest issue of Disaster Research, there is an article regarding government response and recovery and the increase in governmental partnerships with faith- and community-based organizations to assist in cleaning up catastrophes.  In the recent past, we have seen ineffective response from certain portions of government that have assumed responsibility for this service at the local, state and federal levels.  I don’t think anyone who works in our field and  is taken seriously about their views on the subject feels like “government” alone can deliver an entire package of assistance to a disaster-stricken community.  However, there is plenty of debate about how to most effectively coordinate assistance in the wake of a calamity.

Of all things in our industry, our frustration with failure of some politicians to continue to apply heat (and funding) to the problem BEFORE disaster strikes is only compounded by the political “outrage” when disaster occurs and we are accused with not properly preparing in advance (still with limited or no budget or legislative action on our behalf).

In an answer to some of these challenges, some state and local governments are forming coalitions that guide organizations providing emergency response. Missouri, Florida, Texas, and a few others have, according to a recent article in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, begun to develop alliances between emergency managers and NGOs.

There are many discussions regarding the potential for blurred church and state separation which can’t even begin to be adequately addressed in a short blog post.  However, those issues aside, NGOs over the past decade have been efficiently providing disaster recovery assistance and have been successful in finding resources that governmental bodies can’t seem to scare up.

This discussion doesn’t also begin to factor in the entire over-reliance on “outside” help in the event of disaster.  This was a point made by Alan Kirschenbaum in earlier works referring to the growth of the disaster response community that seem to be related to the decline in perception of individual responsibility for preparedness.

While this all has some serious discussion ahead of it, I have less of a problem with this type of assistance than I do with pseudo-qualified responders self deploying to events with little or no capability or self-sufficiency.  I think there are plenty of avenues for a person with altruistic motives to get involved with an organized response; it’s the poseurs and con-men I’m interested in keeping away.

I’m open to some observations on the subject.  I think if managed correctly, these NGOs have access to resources currently limited to those of us charged with response, and we should take advantage of creative partnerships, as the organizations I am affliliated have already done.  Look around your community and identify capability that lies outside of the conventional response.  You’ll be surprised by the resources that lie out there and I think you’ll find that instead of spending essential funds on assets that already exist, you can find better uses for that money in areas that are currently underserved.

Posted by truck6alpha on November 4, 2009 • Filed under: Administration & Leadership, Command & Leadership, DHS, Fire Rescue Topics, Firefighter Nation, Funding & Staffing, Major Incidents, NIMS, National Fire Academy, Special Operations, US&R, USAR, credentialing, government, leadership, planning, politics, revolution • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

1984

4 comments

I woke up very early this morning with some reflections of how the last week has gone and was thinking back to how much easier it was in the “old days”.  While the year 1984 has certain significance to many (you know, the book), the year has certain significance for me because it was my last year to be “one of the guys” and in 1985, I earned my first promotion.

In 1984, things were relatively easy.  I only had to worry about coming to work and making sure my Captain was okay with the things I did, and making sure I didn’t screw anything up.  So long as I did what I was told and tried not to overthink things too much, I could blend in with the team and work together, not worrying too much about how my individual issues affected anyone else. 

When I was hired in 1982 I already had some experience in rescue and I was already a certified EMT.  So in 1984, with my prior experience and the two additional years, I had some credibility that I brought to the team.  My job was to drive the squad, which in our department, carried all the rescue and medical tools we had in those days.  If we had a structure fire, I would slide over to drive the ladder truck instead and my officer would drive the squad.  The rest of the crew was on the engine.  That was pretty much the extent of my decisionmaking responsibility.

In 1984, we hadn’t embraced the computer as a tool.  Alarm and routine information was entered by hand into the station log book, so one of my most important tools was one of those Bic multi-color pens.  Alarms could be entered in red, other stuff in black or blue, and I can’t even remember why we used green, but we did.  Now that was technology.  Things changed in 1985.

By the end of 1984, we had the beginnings of huge changes.  We were adding fire stations and personnel.  The numbers of occupancies in our jurisdiction were growing by leaps and bounds.  We were going through Fire Chiefs as fast as they could be replaced as our commission was being challenged on issues.  We unionized and I was elected the Vice-President of the local.

But my main focus was on the changes in the national industry, because they intrigued me.  As the guy who brought in updated rescue technology from my previous department, I struck forward with the effort to train personnel in confined space entry and rope rescue, in advanced extrication techniques and in the techniques used for structural and trench collapses (when I went through Rescue I and II in Montgomery County, PA in 1981, we were creating tripods, gantries, and a-frames from hemp rope and timber, but the technology went through the roof in a matter of four years).  I got involved on a deeper level and at times, took a lot of heat for it from my colleagues and my superiors as well (nothing like being teased with “Calling Dr. Mick, calling Dr. Mick” because you decide to get your paramedic; ah, but those were the days).

I talked about Heifetz and Linsky in an earlier post and their observation that with change, there is danger.  If you are an agent of change, you will undergo attacks and even character assassination (or ACTUAL assassination: just ask MLK and Gandhi) because you represent a shift from what is comfortable and safe, to unstable and experimental.

Now that we have global access and reach we can share ideas that can both be widely popular and widely challenged.  We have a much more diverse audience and what seems to be understood as a logical solution to an issue may not even be feasible in a different culture or under a different circumstance.  To us, what may be the obvious might be the unreal.  Therefore, it is our responsibility, no matter how surreal the situation, to at least listen and try to comprehend, in an effort to achieve understanding.

That all being said, we all, from our differing viewpoints, carry a responsibility to accept what is right – and by right I mean understood to be realistic and applicable as a result of scientific evaluation and confirmation of our theory, as well as what is right by our fellow man – and not rely on innuendo and supposition.  But when we confirm something to be fact, we need to appreciate it for the change it represents, and regardless of our views on the subject, consider embracing change for the sake of doing what is truly right; that is, what is considered efficacious and for the betterment of our fellow human beings.

Just because someone claims to be the expert, or has insinuated that they should be followed as a result of their experience, fails to understand that what is accepted today is not necessarily the reality, nor is it the ultimate.  Things change.  When someone makes spurious claims, they should back them up with evidence.  Evidence isn’t someone saying “this happened”, evidence requires substantiated proof.

Things have changed a lot since 1984.  We now have expectations in the emergency service field that require us to challenge the people who say “this is true” not for challenging their authority, but to prove that what it is we take for gospel is correct, and that the service we provide based upon those theories are accurate and for the best of the people we serve.  Failing to operate in a transparent manner is only asking for trouble.   We have to accept criticism for what it is and understand that if we put emotion aside, there might be a grain of truth in what is being said.  By being introspective and realizing our faults, we achieve enlightenment. ‘Nuff said.

Posted by truck6alpha on June 22, 2009 • Filed under: DHS, FEMA, SAR, US&R, USAR, change, credentialing, leadership, officership, politics, professionalism • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The Case for Credentialing – An Opposing View

2 comments

I’m distressed that a comment got sent to my spam filter regarding an earlier post and for that I apologize.  The poster made the comment that he didn’t think I’d print it.  As it is, I would hope by now that readers understand that I welcome opposing views, because it is only by listening to what others have to say that we can grow.  Thus, I’m interested in discussing the issues intelligently and understanding the emerging challenges in the emergency service industry.  So since the comment got sent to the spam folder, I don’t feel that it was shared with you all, and I wanted to insure we had equal opportunity to present our views.  If you have a point to make and it can sway my view, then I encourage it. 

First, an excerpt from a letter Mr. Doug Copp sent to my employer:

In his zeal to please some nefarious people at FEMA I believe he has decided than he will promote himself, at my expense..and your town’s expense. I have had a running battle with FEMA for 20 years because they have used major disasters as an opportunity for military and espionage activities while the ‘victim’ country has been in chaos, from the disaster.

As a person who only cares about saving lives..they hate my guts.
Before 911, I was the most experienced rescuer, in the world; since, 911 I have been sick every minute of every day and after 8 years am still being treated by 7 MD Specialists, for my 911 injuries.

 

This is twisted, perverted and a disgrace that this little man should find it necessary to cause me harm. 
How much do I have to suffer? How much abuse do I need to put up with? If he is so twisted…then he should spend his time mutilating small animals and leave me alone.
 

 

 

Then, his comment, which I retrieved from the spam folder:

This is what I submitted to him as a comment, on his blog site. I do not expect that he will have the courage to post it:

http://www.firehousezen.com/2009/05/29/the-case-for-credentialing/

 “It is disgusting that my name which was so destroyed by a psychotic, twisted pervert,,,aka Thomopson Lang..owner of the Albuquerque Journal ..because I refused to give him an emergency pass,,not because he was wearing women’s clothes..not because of his disgusting behavior but mainly because he was an evil, evil man..and even more so because some wannabee phony pretend rescuers see me as an easy target..get a life..go credential your phony ass.

My 20 years of selfless volunteering saved the lives of more than 200,000 lives..go see the proof at www.amerrescue.org

As far as Mr. Copp’s claims that I have offended him in some way, I hope he continues to read this blog and understand that I’m not about divisiveness but about seeking the truth, and as far as I am concerned (and this is my blog) there is a discussion that should be made about the merits and demerits of credentialing.  We presented some opposing ideas and we will discuss others as well.  But as far as dismissing the idea of credentialing because Mr. Copp feels it goes against him and some of the others out there, well, I’m sorry that he feels this animosity toward me. 
Instead of threatening me with a lawsuit, perhaps he can let us all know just what it is he has in the way of scientific evidence defending his points.  I’m only interested in discussing the facts.  I happen to be opposed to self-deploying groups posing as rescue teams and not showing evidence of having met any recognized consensus standards.

I have nothing to gain from only presenting one point of view here on FHZ.  As I said before and I’ll say a thousand times, I don’t blog on duty and I don’t speak for any of the organizations I work for on this blog, so they have nothing to do with anything on here except to serve as good examples of organizations using best practices.

 

Enjoy and have a nice day.
Posted by truck6alpha on June 18, 2009 • Filed under: DHS, FEMA, NIMS, SAR, US&R, USAR, Uncategorized, change, credentialing, government, leadership, politics, professionalism, rescue • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , ,

The Case for Credentialing – Those Who Can't Get In

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sctf1-333My final group of people who are not happy with credentialing efforts are the “outsiders”.  To me, they are the ones with the most logical and compelling concerns about credentialing.  Ironically, these people are often those already with some responsibility for response, or they are in the process of trying to improve the capability.  In more than one case I am aware of, these efforts went about to fill a vacuum where poor or absent service existed.  And interestingly enough, the people working hard to improve the service have been effectively kept out of the loop by those who guard the credentialing development process.

Now to those who I hear constantly venting that they can’t understand who comes up with “these standards”, I tell these people all the time that as far as the NFPA standards go, THEY have an opportunity to write them if they were to just apply.  The NFPA standards process is very transparent and open to anyone who cares to get involved.  If you’re new to the process, sometimes it takes a little of help navigating the process, but there are people (like me) who help people find the information they want and point them in a direction on a regular basis.  Even if you aren’t on a committee, you are still encouraged to comment on proposed standards.  The public can attend NFPA committee meetings and the public and interested responders can discuss standards with principal members. 

However, there are groups making standards that may very well be used for credentialing purposes where I, and many in my same position, have no idea how the committees got picked.  When pushed for information, there have been slow or no communications in response to the standards being created. When asked, the individuals involved in these standards aren’t so forthcoming with their process or their logic.  In fact, in some cases these groups have ignored the people who aren’t in their “circle”. So I can certainly understand the frustration, because I’m one of you.

There was a time in my early career that I wanted to get involved in improving my chosen profession and interestingly enough, met with resistance from those in control.  One situation I am referring to was while dealing with a committee appointed by a training institution for the purpose of developing curriculum that frankly, was teaching information and skills about ten years behind the existing technical rescue methodology.  The excuse?  “That’s not how we do it HERE”.

In fact, there have been times in the US&R industry (and this is occurring literally, right this minute), where players that have political power but no clue about US&R are actively pushing for control of that “legally authorized responder” designation for their own ill-prepared organizations, despite the presence of already qualified and genuinely proactive individuals who are already leading efforts.

So to me, here is the place where the credentialing talks meet resistance and an extreme amount of concern. I am not interested in a credentialing process that excludes individuals from contributing to the development of the standards used.  The concern is especially strong when in some cases, the standards are slanted toward keeping people in positions rather than in insuring qualified people have the qualifications.  There is a fine line between saying we require you to maintain certification from a certain agency and permitting equivalency in order to permit other certifications that meet the intent of the certification.  The easy way would be to simply identify objective criteria for people and organizations to meet and to certify to that standard, but then there comes the difficult (and expensive) method of evaluating that capability.

Really, where do you draw the line on “equivalency”?  If the Acme Fire Department issues a certification as a Rescue Technician, should that carry the same weight as someone with a certification from their state fire academy?  Or from a third-party provider?

These are hard questions to answer and the chief argument against credentialing.  It’s because there are those of us in the industry fighting against those who have drawn a line benefiting a few to the exclusion of many.  My inner skeptic says that these standards have been established simply to promote someone’s agenda.  Now this is an argument that has been inappropriately used against NFPA standards for a while- that a certain interest group would control the standards in order to further their own agenda.  If there is anyplace where that is less true, it would be in NFPA committees.  Especially in professional qualifications committees, if a certain balance isn’t achieved to avoid self-interest, there are marked efforts to re-balance the committee.  I can’t say that to be true about some of the credentialing proposals I have seen.

We do, however, have to insist not necessarily on adopting a certification from a certain agency to be credentialed, but instead to insist on adherence to evaluation and confirmation of knowledge, skills, and abilities that meet the needs of a certain position, or in the case of organizations and teams, meeting objective criteria that define a type and kind of response asset.  From here, this is where we will transition into the argument in favor of credentialing.  See you next time.

Posted by truck6alpha on June 17, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The Case for Credentialing – Those Who Can't Get In

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sctf1-333My final group of people who are not happy with credentialing efforts are the “outsiders”.  To me, they are the ones with the most logical and compelling concerns about credentialing.  Ironically, these people are often those already with some responsibility for response, or they are in the process of trying to improve the capability.  In more than one case I am aware of, these efforts went about to fill a vacuum where poor or absent service existed.  And interestingly enough, the people working hard to improve the service have been effectively kept out of the loop by those who guard the credentialing development process.

Now to those who I hear constantly venting that they can’t understand who comes up with “these standards”, I tell these people all the time that as far as the NFPA standards go, THEY have an opportunity to write them if they were to just apply.  The NFPA standards process is very transparent and open to anyone who cares to get involved.  If you’re new to the process, sometimes it takes a little of help navigating the process, but there are people (like me) who help people find the information they want and point them in a direction on a regular basis.  Even if you aren’t on a committee, you are still encouraged to comment on proposed standards.  The public can attend NFPA committee meetings and the public and interested responders can discuss standards with principal members. 

However, there are groups making standards that may very well be used for credentialing purposes where I, and many in my same position, have no idea how the committees got picked.  When pushed for information, there have been slow or no communications in response to the standards being created. When asked, the individuals involved in these standards aren’t so forthcoming with their process or their logic.  In fact, in some cases these groups have ignored the people who aren’t in their “circle”. So I can certainly understand the frustration, because I’m one of you.

There was a time in my early career that I wanted to get involved in improving my chosen profession and interestingly enough, met with resistance from those in control.  One situation I am referring to was while dealing with a committee appointed by a training institution for the purpose of developing curriculum that frankly, was teaching information and skills about ten years behind the existing technical rescue methodology.  The excuse?  “That’s not how we do it HERE”.

In fact, there have been times in the US&R industry (and this is occurring literally, right this minute), where players that have political power but no clue about US&R are actively pushing for control of that “legally authorized responder” designation for their own ill-prepared organizations, despite the presence of already qualified and genuinely proactive individuals who are already leading efforts.

So to me, here is the place where the credentialing talks meet resistance and an extreme amount of concern. I am not interested in a credentialing process that excludes individuals from contributing to the development of the standards used.  The concern is especially strong when in some cases, the standards are slanted toward keeping people in positions rather than in insuring qualified people have the qualifications.  There is a fine line between saying we require you to maintain certification from a certain agency and permitting equivalency in order to permit other certifications that meet the intent of the certification.  The easy way would be to simply identify objective criteria for people and organizations to meet and to certify to that standard, but then there comes the difficult (and expensive) method of evaluating that capability.

Really, where do you draw the line on “equivalency”?  If the Acme Fire Department issues a certification as a Rescue Technician, should that carry the same weight as someone with a certification from their state fire academy?  Or from a third-party provider?

These are hard questions to answer and the chief argument against credentialing.  It’s because there are those of us in the industry fighting against those who have drawn a line benefiting a few to the exclusion of many.  My inner skeptic says that these standards have been established simply to promote someone’s agenda.  Now this is an argument that has been inappropriately used against NFPA standards for a while- that a certain interest group would control the standards in order to further their own agenda.  If there is anyplace where that is less true, it would be in NFPA committees.  Especially in professional qualifications committees, if a certain balance isn’t achieved to avoid self-interest, there are marked efforts to re-balance the committee.  I can’t say that to be true about some of the credentialing proposals I have seen.

We do, however, have to insist not necessarily on adopting a certification from a certain agency to be credentialed, but instead to insist on adherence to evaluation and confirmation of knowledge, skills, and abilities that meet the needs of a certain position, or in the case of organizations and teams, meeting objective criteria that define a type and kind of response asset.  From here, this is where we will transition into the argument in favor of credentialing.  See you next time.

Posted by truck6alpha on June 17, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The Case for Credentialing – Answering Your Comments

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I hate to break free in the middle of this series like this, but there were some comments made that I wanted to discuss.  Since one is on one post and the other is on another post, I felt the need to tie them together and talk really quickly to the issue.

On June 15, Steve said:

Yes, credentials would help but WHO is the final authority on issuing them? WHO sets the standards? How are you going to avoid the age old paid vs volunteer bias in any credentialing agency?

My quick answer: I am against the bias in the career vs. volunteer.  If you can meet the standard, you can meet the standard.  I think there is plenty of room for volunteers, especially in disaster response.  So some career guy is going to tell me my docs can’t be part of the team because they aren’t career guys somewhere?  And I have said in regard to SC-TF1, where I do have some pull, if one person in a one-station volunteer department down the road wants to be part of our team, we need to let him if he meets our criteria (background check, physical agility, etc.)  As Ray Wilkinson, our past Director once said, “I can teach someone to break rocks, what I can’t teach is desire.”  If someone wants to do the job, and goes through the requirements to meet a position, why should I care if he’s a member of FDNY or of Acme Fire Department?  So Steve, I’m with ya, brother.

On June 16, Kevin said:

I live in a state where there is no agency tasked with certifying or credentialing Search and Rescue dogs. I have seen (many times) where someone will buy lights for their POV and load their pet dog into the truck and call themselves a SAR team! If I didn’t know better, I might think all volunteer SAR teams were like this. However, there are a number of excellent non-governmental SAR teams in my state as well. I myself and a member of a volunteer K9 team.

Kevin goes on to say that they have a volunteer K9 SAR team because there isn’t an existing asset and law enforcement has asked for it.  Well, Kevin, as they say in Australia, “good on ya”.  You have identified a need and you have tried to meet that need.  No one else has that asset and it sounds like you have tried to do a good job of using accepted industry standards to meet the need.  THAT is good stuff.

However, I just went to discuss the concept of “those of us who want to do this right, but there are people with authority screwing things up so we can’t get in”, and realized that the post I wrote for that last week never posted as scheduled!  So that is now on the post schedule and I hope it does discuss some of the feelings I personally have in that regard. 

On June 16th, SAR Volunteer also commented:

I totally agree with your points. Please understand this are a handful of small volunteer K9 SAR teams in the state of SC who do NOT self deploy, do NOT work for anyone but the proper state or municipal authorities, train hard, carry their own liability and workmenscomp insurance, align their standards with NIMS Resource Typing, and are working to ensure they meet the proposed credentialing requirements.

And to you too, SAR Vollie, I applaud your efforts.  I think there is a place for the small volunteer K9 teams at the table as well, if they meet a standard.  Let’s take SC-TF1 again for example.  I have said over and over again, if we have people out there who want to do this stuff, let’s get them involved.  But not being a canine guy, I have some difficulty understanding some of the things the canine types are telling me.  So when I get national experts telling me one thing, and some guy with Rover in a pickup truck (or Expedition, as it were) saying his dog can detect live scent, cadavers, lost pets, and get a beer and catch a frisbee, understand that I am skeptical.  And the self-deploying thing is just purely bad in my book, but that’s a whole other issue as well that doesn’t stop with canine SAR teams, and DOES include career guys, departments, and organized teams, etc.  Frankly, if you (SAR Vollie) or anyone else in SC have dogs trained to find LIVE HUMANS in collapsed or damaged buildings, and feel like you can meet a standard, send me an e-mail.  I’d love to hear from you.  But anyone who calls themselves “Urban Search and Rescue” and they are running around doing wilderness searches, well, go back to my box of rocks comment.  Be what you say you are.

Anyway, I hope this illustrates some of the issues considered so far and we’ll get back on track with the next post (which should have published before the last one- go figure).  Please continue with your comments.  I certainly appreciate your perspectives.  Stay safe.

Posted by truck6alpha on June 16, 2009 • Filed under: DHS, FEMA, NIMS, National Fire Academy, SAR, US&R, USAR, Uncategorized, change, command, credentialing, education, government, leadership, officership, politics, professionalism, rescue, safety • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Update to the Series – Spontaneous Bystanders Unite

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I guess I had an idea ahead of its time, even if it was only 48 hours ahead.:

There are indeed a few challenges with this kind of emergent response, problems that if resolved, would go a long way toward goodwill with the community in general (it seems like everyone’s got some kind of beef with FEMA in every disaster, despite their extraordinary efforts to educate people that they need to be more self-sufficient and less reliant on the government), and provide resources to the jurisdictionally responsible agencies that seem to be strapped for bodies when the big one rolls around to their neighborhood.

What am I talking about?  This announcement, from FEMA’s Craig Fugate, which came out in today’s Washington Post, advocates the idea that the public could effectively be used.  What a concept.

Posted by truck6alpha on June 4, 2009 • Filed under: DHS, FEMA, NIMS, SAR, US&R, USAR, change, command, credentialing, fire service, government, motivation, planning, politics, professionalism • Tagged: , , , , , ,

The Case For Credentialing – The Argument

11 comments
SC-TF1 in Chalmette, September 2005

SC-TF1 in Chalmette, September 2005

As discussed in the last post, there are those who are against credentialing, for their own reasons.  Because I have had plenty of discussions about the subject, I think I have the discussions channeled into four groups (and if you have a different argument, let me know, because I don’t want to miss anything on the subject).  I plan to talk about each of these in a little more depth, but I wanted to at least put the parameters of the argument out there.

First, we have the genuine thing, the spontaneous bystander, who sees a need for action, then does something about it.  The discussion I have heard so far from this camp is that there should be nothing that would stand in the way of people who just have a desire to help their neighbors and do the right thing.  Quarantelli discusses the social aspects of emergent response from spontaneous bystanders in Katrina, but also in the Guadalajara gasoline spill and fire.  Plain ol’ people like every other neighbor you ever had saved lives, and were not agents of the government, had no training, and only did so in the effort to help others.  There’s something very beautiful in that, but call me skeptical, I see a lot of response from people who claim that is their motive, but I’m not seeing that altruism coming out when they’re out operating the video camera or taking souvenirs, rather than manning a sand-bag line.  More about THAT kind of person later.

We also have the disaffected group/person I call the “outsider”.  Having been one on a few occasions, I can certainly empathize with their cause, but I don’t necessarily sympathize with their way of handling things all the time.  Often, these are people who have a lot of training, or maybe come from somewhere where they had a lot of training and experience, and the place they are now in life won’t make room to allow them in.  There are dozens of reasons we will discuss, but there are also some issues regarding the credentialing side of things that would STRENGTHEN their position if they were in fact, truly qualified but being marginalized.

Then there are those who are currently the jurisdictional responder but are afraid the light of truth will expose that their organization/agency is not following industry standards, or that they are not ready, or are failing in any number of reasons.  These people really don’t have much sympathy from me in regard to their argument against credentialing.  However, there might be some discussion that merits a look.  I’ll reserve my judgement for now.

And finally, there are the thrill and glory seekers.  They might be there for the attention, they might be there for the notch in their gun, or they may be there to profit by defrauding the response community.  So as of now, this is where I stand and these are the arguments I want to discuss at first.  There are in some, compelling ideas.  There are in the others, no possible way you’ll be able to get me to support their theory.  But we’ll talk about them and I’d love to get your thoughts on the subject.  See you in a few.

Posted by truck6alpha on May 30, 2009 • Filed under: DHS, FEMA, General, Media Relations, NIMS, USAR, command, credentialing, planning, politics, professionalism, rescue, safety • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , ,

Multiplicity of Command

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2005-10111How many more times does disaster have to strike before responders finally learn the lesson of the need for unified command?  How many times do agencies need to experience a tug-of-war over resources, slow response to needs due to poor inter-agency communication, and lousy coordination all because the “powers that be” refuse to put their egos aside and agree to play nicely together?

As evidenced by disaster after disaster, when jurisdictions experiencing wide-spread disaster fail to work together to coordinate, their problems become exacerbated.

I know there are plenty of responders out there who have their own little bit of heartburn over NIMS.  Sometimes it is a little too clunky, and the feelings have been documented by researchers like Buck, Trainor and Aguirre.  Decision-making in disasters has been a problem for long before we began to study disaster management.  An interesting paper by Thomas Drabek in the 1983 International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, “Alternative  Patterns of Decisionmaking in Emergent Disasters“, indicated several qualities found in disasters that influenced decision-making.  The disasters were multi-organizational in that they exceeded the capabilities of locals and thus required outside assistance.  The disasters had a diverse array of resources needed, therefore there was much in the way of technical understanding that needed expert overview.  There were “loose couplings”, in that the players often had little to no interaction prior to the event taking place, therefore unfamiliarity with personalities and capabilities.  The organization that emerged from the disaster grew over time, often overwhelming the initial responders.  Finally, the disasters still retained much in the way of local control and for whatever reason, the AHJ maintained that control even when faced with being overwhelmed by the incident.

I found the last point to be an interesting one; while in my opinion it is important that the AHJ retain control over an incident, the incident commander must have the courage and the intelligence to determine when and at what point the incident is overwhelming his/her ability to manage the incident, and to not be afraid of developing a unified command.  With rare exception, local managers are generally lacking in the experience of confronting a managerial problem of this complexity, and instead of riding it out and insisting everything is “just fine”, they need to reach out to the assistance being offered from regional and state (and federal authorities, if indicated) to provide advice and resources to bring the suffering of their community to bear.  Failing to do so is tantamount to abandoning your community.

The basics of NIMS are sound; the principal tenets revolving around division of labor and the unity of command are borne out on a daily basis on firegrounds and every other kind of emergency we can think of.  Multiple “commands” at a large, wide-area incident, absent the coordination of a local emergency operations center and a more centralized command structure, will only end up in the waste of valuable resources, time, and patience.  One unified incident command managing several Area Commands works.  Doing so will minimize the confusion and add to the  proper allocation of resources, and insure that the overall incident is managed.

When you don’t play the game, you are saying that it is your world, and we’re all just living in it.  I realize the intense pressure of having to deal with a rapidly deteriorating condition and the inability, sometimes, to just get your hands around it.  When I have had this happen, I have found that sometimes its best to take a step back, look over the situation, and take it one bite at a time.  But when you have entrenched yourself and refuse to plan in advance for disasters, thinking that you are going to handle everything yourself and that your community doesn’t need help from the outside, well, you are setting yourself up for a fall.  And when you stray from the basics of incident management, something will eventually give.

Don’t be afraid to let others help, especially in areas where you may not be as experienced.  If you have resources being offered to you to help manage things, consider them a tool to use, not a crutch.  And realize that in the face of a major disaster, it’s not just about you; your community has neighbors and they too may need assistance. It’s a good idea to work with them ahead of time so you know where everyone is coming from.  Realize that all resources are limited and that’s a good reason to be talking with everyone involved, because each of these stakeholders have a lot to contribute, but as stakeholders, they also have a lot to lose.  A unified command at a major incident is definitely the way to go.

Posted by truck6alpha on April 24, 2009 • Filed under: FEMA, command, fire service, officership, planning, politics, professionalism • Tagged: , , , , , ,